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VI

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This unlawful detainer case was decided on summary judgment by the trial court.
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction over this matter as an appeal
from an order which did not fall under the original appellate jurisdiction of the Utah
Court of Appeals. Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)0)0 996). Pursuant to Utah Code section 78-22(4), and Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court has
transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals thus conferring appellate jurisdiction on
this Court under Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented to this Court as a result of the trial court's
decision on motion for summary judgment that Appellant had no interest in real property
where he was living and, therefore, that he was subject to removal under Utah's unlawful
detainer statute1:
1.

Issue: Did the trial court err in determining by summary judgment that

1

Transcripts of two different hearings were requested by Appellant and have been
prepared for this Court. The dates of the transcripts are February 16, 1999 and May 9,
1999. At some point in the transcription process the dates were switched with the
transcript of the arguments on the summary judgment motion being dated May 9, 1999,
and the transcript of the trial court's decision being dated February 16, 1999. Rather than
referring to these hearings by date, this brief will refer to the transcript denominated as
May 9, 1999, as the Motion Hearing and the transcript denominated as February 16, 1999
as the Decision Hearing.
1

Appellee Michael Bowen, following his divorce from Appellee Kristen Hortin, retained
an ownership interest in the real property which would allow him to interfere with the
purchase of the property by Appellant from Hortin.
Factual Preservation: This issue was argued at the Motion Hearing before the
trial court and preserved for appeal when counsel for Appellant argued that Appellee
Hortin was awarded the marital home subject to Appellee Bowen's equity interest and
that Hortin had the right to sell the home to Appellant. Record at 276, p. 7. The trial
court determined at the summary judgment Decision Hearing that any transfer of the
home would require Appellee Bowen's approval and that the provision of the divorce
decree ordering the Appellees to sign any necessary documents to implement the terms of
the decree of divorce did not require Bowen to sign a deed to sell the home. Record at
275, pp. 3, 5.
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is only appropriate when there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The facts and all reasonable inferences arising from those facts are viewed in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Entitlement to summary judgment is a question
of law with no deference given to the trial court's determination of the issues presented.
Julian v. Petersen, 966 P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 1998).
2.

Issue: Did the trial court err in determining by summary judgment that the

option agreement between Jones and Hortin was not extended through Hortin and
2

Bowen's acquiescence and Hortin's subsequent signing of closing documents which
included provision for payment of accrued rent.
Factual Preservation: At the Motion Hearing, Appellant raised the issue that
his option agreement to purchase the property, although expiring by its terms prior to any
closing, was extended through both the acquiescence and the bad faith acts of Bowen and
Hortin. Record at 276, pp. 13-17. In announcing its decision, the trial court stated that
there may be issues of fact which would need to be heard on the issue of extending the
option to purchase but held that Jones' failure to make monthly payments on the property
resulted in his having unclean hands and therefore was not entitled to equitable relief.
Record at 275. pp. 2-4.
Standard of Review: In considering an appeal of the grant of summary
judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences from them are reviewed in a light most
favorable to the losing party. The legal conclusions reached by the trial court are
accorded no deference but, instead, are reviewed for correctness. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854
P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1993). In cases involving equity, a reviewing court will reject
the findings of a trial court if the evidence clearly preponderates against those findings or
if there was a misapplication of the law. Ryan v. Earl 618 P.2d 54, 55 (Utah 1980).
3.

Issue: Assuming that Appellee Bowen's approval for the sale of the property

to Appellant was not required and even if there was no extension of the option to
purchase, did the trial court err by failing to find that Appellee Hortin created a new and
3

binding contract for the sale of property by signing closing documents including a
warranty deed, or, in the alternative, does the merger doctrine apply to Appellee Hortin's
actions.
Factual Preservation: At the Motion Hearing, plaintiff raised the issue that the
lease and option agreements did not control ownership of the property because a warranty
deed had been signed by Appellant Hortin. Record at 276, p. 29. Counsel for Appellants
acknowledged that if Hortin had "signed a contract to purchase or a deed perhaps they
would have some kind of a point with regard to at least her agreeing to sell . . . " Id. pp.
29-30. Because the trial court had ruled that Bowen's signature was required to sell the
home, it did not decide this issue. Record at 275. pp. 4, 7-8. These issues were also
raised by Jones in the fourth and fifth defenses of his answer where he claimed that title
to the property should be quieted in him and that by executing the closing documents,
appellee Hortin completed a contract for the sale of the property to Appellee. Record at
18.
Standard of Review: Whether a contract exists between parties is a question
of law and the trial court's conclusion of law are reviewed under a correction of error
standard. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah App. 1992).
Whether the doctrine of merger applies is a question of law that is reviewed for
correctness with the reviewing court affording no particular deference to the trial court.
Mavnard v. Wharton. 912 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah App. 1996).
4

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provision(s) are either determinative of the appeal or are of
central importance to the issues presented on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1998). Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of
any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1998). Right to specific performance not affected.
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of
courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance
thereof.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action for eviction was filed on December 10, 1998. The plaintiffs below and
appellants on appeal Michael Bowen (hereinafter Bowen) and Kristen Hortin (hereinafter
Hortin) alleged in their complaint that defendant and appellee Teak D. Jones (hereinafter
Jones) was renting property from them, that Jones had been served with a five day notice
to vacate the property and had failed to comply therewith. Bowen and Hortin sought
judgment for past due rent, attorneys fees and an order of eviction. Jones answered the
complaint alleging that he had the right to possess the property by virtue of a lease and
option agreement to purchase the property under which he had tendered payment but
which tender had been refused by Bowen. A possession bond was filed by Bowen and
Hortin and Jones filed a counter possession bond.
Hortin and Bowen filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 15, 1999.
This was supported by an affidavit signed by Bowen (hereinafter "Bowen Affi"). Jones
filed an opposition memorandum and affidavit (hereinafter "Jones Aff.") on January 25,
1999. Hortin and Bowen filed their responsive memorandum on January 26, 1999. On
February 16, 1999, the trial court held a Motion Hearing at which counsel for both sides
appeared and made their respective arguments. Based on questions raised at that hearing,
the trial court allowed the parties to file supplemental information to assist the court in
making its decision. Jones filed and amended memorandum opposing summary judgment
on February 18, 1999, and Hortin and Bowen filed their response to Jones' amended
6

opposition memorandum on February 23, 1999. On April 9, 1999, the trial court held a
hearing at which the judge informed the parties she was granting Hortin and Bowen's
motion for summary judgment (the Decision Hearing). Counsel for Hortin and Bowen
was directed to prepare the order. The order granting the motion for summary judgment
was signed on April 26, 1999.
Following the Decision Hearing several other motions immaterial to the issues
presented on appeal were filed, including a request by Jones' counsel that he be allowed
to withdraw. Ultimately, on May 11, 1999, the trial court allowed counsel for Jones to
withdraw and directed that the writ of restitution removing Jones the property be
enforced. Jones obtained new counsel who filed a motion for extension of time to file a
notice of appeal on May 13, 1999. Hortin and Bowen joined together to oppose the
extension of time to file an appeal, however the trial court signed an order granting that
motion on July 9, 1999, and the order was entered on July 13, 1999. Jones filed his
Notice of Appeal on Monday, July 19, 1999.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. During their marriage, Bowen and Hortin acquired a home located at 2614
North 700 East, North Ogden, Weber County, Utah. Record at 59-60, T| 12. The deed
conveyed the home to Bowen and Hortin as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship
and not as tenants in common. Record at 160.
7

2. Several years later, on or about July 16, 1996, Bowen and Hortin were divorced
and a decree of divorce was entered in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber
County, Ogden Department. The Decree of Divorce contained provisions relating to
possession of the home, responsibility for debt on the home and described the financial
rights as between Bowen and Hortin to the home. Record at 56-64.
3. Bowen was ordered to pay alimony to Hortin until such time as she remarried,
graduated from college or acquired full time employment. However, in no event was
alimony to continue beyond August 1, 2000. The timing contained in the alimony
provision affected Bowen's equity interest in the home. Record at 59-60, ]flj 8, 12.
4. The Decree of Divorce provided that Bowen would maintain an interest in the
home until it was sold or until the alimony obligation terminated. At that point, Bowen's
financial interest in the home would become fixed. Bowen's interest was to be in the
form of a non-interest bearing lien equal to one-half of the equity in the home as that
equity was agreed upon between Hortin and Bowen or as established by an appraisal.
The Decree then contains directions for when Bowen's equity interest would actually be
paid to him. Record at 59-60, ^| 12.
5. The Decree gave Hortin possession of the home and directed her to pay the
mortgage loan payments as well as the balance of all home equity loans. Record at 59-60,
1112-13.
6. On or about March 6, 1997, Hortin contracted with Jones to list the home for
8

sale for a six month period. Bowen did not sign the listing agreement. Record at 54 ^j 3
(Jones Aff).
7. During the listing period, Hortin accepted two different offers on the home
without also obtaining Bowen's signature. Neither sale was completed. Record at 69, f 4
(Jones Aff).
8. On or about December 17, 1997, Hortin and Jones entered into a lease
agreement and option to purchase the home. Record at 66-67.
9. Although Bowen eventually signed his name to both the lease and the option
agreement, he was not a named party to either contract. The lease and option were to
expire in July 1998. Record at 66-67.
10. At some point after the lease and option agreements were signed, Jones took
possession of the property. Record at 71-72, ^ | 14-15 (Jones Aff). Jones remained there
until the trial court ordered his removal. Record at 275, p. 6.
11. Jones did not tender payment or close the transaction within the time period
set forth on the face of the option agreement. Record at 37, ^J 4 (Bowen Aff.).
12. During the period of Jones' occupation of the property, he made two payments
representing approximately four months worth of rental payments. It is undisputed that
Jones failed to make regular monthly rental payments. Record at 37, ^J 4 (Bowen Aff.).
13. In May 1998, prior to the expiration of the first option agreement, Bowen
obtained another document entitled, Lease and Option to Purchase with an expiration date
9

of August 31, 1998. Record at 37,fflf1-2 (Bowen Aff.).
14. There is a dispute as to whether this second document ever became operative
between the parties and the trial court did not rely on this document or the deadlines
contained therein in making its order at the Decision Hearing. Record at 275, p. 2.
15. Neither the first or second option agreements were extended in writing.
Record at 37, ^ 3 (Bowen Aff.).
16. In November 1998, after both option agreements had expired by their terms,
Jones' wife, Diana Marie Harrison (hereinafter "Harrison"), who was not a party to this
action in the trial court, was substituted for Jones on the closing documents. Record at
37-38, H 5 (Bowen Aff).
17. On or about November 12. 1998, Hortin signed the necessan documents to
close the sale of the home. Hortin signed the documents at St. George, Washington
County, Utah and then sent them to a title company in Ogden. Record at 87-95.
18. The closing documents included a warranty deed signed by Hortin and
conveying the property to Harrison together with a settlement statement containing the
purchase price of the home and other financial information regarding the sale of the home
including an option payment to cover unpaid rent on the property equal to five months
worth of rent. Record at 93, 95.
19. On August 31, 1998, Jones was delinquent in the payment of rent in an
amount equal to two months worth of rent. That amount would have grown to equal five
10

months worth of rent at the end of November, 1998. Record at 38, ^ 9 (Bowen Aff).
20. Bowen did not sign the closing documents or the warranty deed transferring
the property to Harrison. Record at 87-95.
21. On November 25, 1988, almost two weeks after Hortin signed the closing
documents, Bowen and Hortin caused a five day notice to vacate to be delivered to the
Weber County Sheriff. Record at 38, ^f 6 (Bowen Aff). The notice was posted on the
property on or about November 30, 1998 and was mailed to Jones on or about December
1, 1998. Record at 38, ^ 6 (Bowen Aff).

11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court failed to properly establish Bowen's interest in the property at the
time that Hortin attempted to sell the property to Jones. Following the entry of the
Bowen-Hortin divorce decree, Bowen's interest in the property was governed by the
language of that decree. At the time Hortin signed the closing papers, if Bowen was no
longer paying alimony, then his only interest in the home was financial and he would not
have needed to sign the closing documents. On the other hand, if Bowen was still paying
alimony and had an ownership interest in the property, his signature would have been
required to complete the sale of the property to Jones or Jones' assignee. Because the
trial court examined only the decree and did not investigate the facts surrounding whether
Bowen was still paying alimony, it could not draw the legal conclusion that Jones did not
have an interest in the property based on Bowen's failure to signed the closing documents
or any extension to the option agreement. In addition, if Bowen acted unreasonably in
withholding his signature from the closing documents, the trial court should have
compelled his assistance in completing the sale of the property to Jones.
Although the written option agreement between Hortin and Jones (which had also
been assented to by Bowen) had expired, the trial court should have heard additional facts
as to whether Hortin and Bowen were estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a
defense to Jones' claim that he, or his assignee, had an interest in the property. Despite
the fact that the option agreement expired in July, 1998, the parties continued to follow a
12

course of conduct suggesting that the option agreement was still being held open. The
most obvious evidence of this is the signing by Hortin of closing documents in November
1998. Bowen, both by his silence and his failure to act until after the attempted closing in
November 1998, should be estopped from asserting the statute of frauds. Jones changed
his position in reliance on the non-written extension of the option contract. Jones also
partially performed under the oral extension thus justifying a departure from the statute of
frauds. The trial court essentially acknowledged that this was a factual question, however
it found that Jones had failed to make monthly rental payments under his lease agreement,
and therefore, that he was not entitled to equitable relief. However, the trial court's
conclusion was in error because it failed to acknowledge that at the time of the attempted
closing, a payment for past due rent was included in the closing documents. Jones
tendered payment of the amount in question, and even though his tender was rejected, he
is entitled to a factual hearing regarding his equitable claims.
The case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether Hortin entered
into a new contract to sell the property by signing a warranty deed and other closing
documents in November 1998. Even if the option agreement between Jones and Hortin
and assented to by Bowen had expired and was not extended, Hortin's actions in
accepting the terms contained in the closing documents created a new and valid contract
for the sale of the property. In the alternative, if a new contract was not created, because
a warranty deed was signed by Hortin in November, 1998, the terms of the underlying
13

option agreement would have been merged into the warranty deed and any right on the
part of Bowen and Hortin to argue that the option had expired or the lease terminated
would have been extinguished. The trial court did not review these issues because Bowen
had not signed the closing documents. However, the factual issue of whether Bowen
unreasonably withheld his signature from the sales documents and should be required to
participate in the closing was not addressed below. If Bowen's failure to participate was
unreasonable, this new or merged transaction should have been recognized as valid and
Jones' presence on the property could not be challenged by Hortin and Bowen.

14

ARGUMENT
The trial court in this matter determined on Hortin's and Bowen's motion for
summary judgment that Jones had no interest in the property where Jones was residing
and therefore, that he was subject to removal as a tenant at will. However, significant
factual issues are present in this case which must be fully heard prior to making a ruling
that Jones was not entitled to possession of the property. They include: (1) the effect of
Bowen and Hortin's decree of divorce on the ability of Bowen to interfere with Jones"
purchase of the real property; (2) whether Jones or his assignee was entitled to an
extension of time to perform under the option contract even though there was no written
extension of the option: and (3) even if the option agreement was not extended, whether
Hortin's actions of signing all of the closing documents, including a warranty deed,
created a new contract for the sale of the property or resulted in merger of the prior
agreements with the deed. Because the key facts relating to these issues are in dispute,
the case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

I.

THERE IS A MATERIAL FACTUAL DISPUTE AS TO WHAT KIND
OF INTEREST BOWEN HAD IN THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF
THE SALE, AND IF HE HAD AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST, A
QUESTION AS TO WHETHER BOWEN UNREASONABLY
WITHHELD HIS CONSENT TO THE SALE.

15

A. The Bowen-Hortin Divorce Decree Altered Bowen 's Rights To The Property
And Controls Bowen fs Ability To Interfere With Any Sale Of The Property
Because Bowen and Hortin are divorced, their Decree of Divorce supercedes their
deed as to their respective ownership interests in the property. Although Bowen and
Hortin were, and still are, joint tenants of the property with full rights of survivorship, that
condition is modified by the fact that Bowen and Hortin are now divorced and their
respective interests in the property have been altered by their decree of divorce. For
example, if either Bowen or Hortin were to die, it cannot be contended that the survivor
would be entitled to receive the property by right of survivorship. See Utah Code Ann. §
75-2-804(2)(b)(1998). A court in a divorce action has the authority to make orders
relating to the property, debts and obligations of the parties to the divorce. Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5(l)(1999 Supp.). Included in this power is the ability of a trial court to
award the marital home to one party or another. In this case, the trial court reviewed the
decree of divorce and determined, without taking evidence on the issue, that Bowen's
retained interest in the home required his approval prior to the closing between Harrison
and Hortin.
The issue which requires additional factual review, is what Bowen's retained
interest actually entitled him to do with regard to the sale of the marital home. There are
several Utah cases which illustrate the need for a trial court to make a determination as to
what interests a spouse retains prior to deciding sales contract issues. One case which

16

closely matched the facts at issue here is Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352 (Utah 1991). In
Krantz, the purchaser had signed an earnest money sales agreement to buy property from
a divorced woman. 819 P.2d at 353. The agreement required approval by the woman's
ex-husband, Stephen Holt. IcL The property was titled in joint tenancy between Holt and
his ex-wife, the decree of divorce had not been recorded and Holt had not deeded the
property to his wife. IcL However, there was also evidence that Holt's interest had been
terminated by virtue of a divorce decree. The Krantz court stated that if "Holt retained a
joint interest in the property, his written consent to the property's sale would be
necessary, not because of any clause in the agreement, but because the Utah statute of
frauds so requires." 819 P.2d at 353. That court went on to clarify that "there would be
no such requirement if. as Krantz contends, Stephen Holt retained no interest in the
property pursuant to the divorce decree." IdL at 354. Under those circumstances, an oral
rather than written assent to the sale would have satisfied the agreement. The Krantz
court found that "the issue of whether Stephen Holt had a joint interest in the property
during the relevant dates of this case is a question of fact. Because there are outstanding
questions of fact regarding Holt's ex-husband's approval of the transfer, summary
judgment cannot be sustained on this ground." Icf As in Krantz, the factual issues that
must be resolved in this case relate to the need for appellee Bowen to approve a sale of
property where, like Holt, his name appeared on the public records as a joint tenant and a
divorce decree dealing with the property has been entered but not recorded and no deed
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has been signed by him to Hortin.
In this case, the trial court was provided a copy of the decree of divorce for Bowen
and Hortin. The language describing Bowen's interest is where the focus of any analysis
should rest. The decree contains a two step process for Bowen to receive his financial
interest out of the home. The first step has to do with the fixing or establishment of the
amount of Bowen's interest. The decree states that at the time Bowen ceases paying
alimony, the amount of his interest would be set at one half of the equity in the home.
The amount of equity was to be determined by either an appraisal or by agreement
between Bowen and Hortin. The second step set in the decree governs the timing of any
payment to Bowen of his financial interest. The decree states that after the first step was
completed, Bowen would have a non-interest bearing lien equal to the amount of his
financial interest in the home. In this case the trial court took no evidence and made no
factual or legal determination as to whether Bowen was still paying alimony, and even if
he was, how his interest in the home would have changed depending on whether he was
in the first or second step of the divorce decree's plan. Without this information, the trial
court could not rule on summary judgment that Jones did not have the right to remain on
the property.
The relevance of where Bowen stood in the two step process is highlighted in
Booth v. Booth, 772 P.2d 771 (Utah 1986). In Booth, an ex-husband was ordered by the
lower court to sign documents to accomplish the sale of the marital home. 722 P.2d at
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771. The decree in that case "awarded the real property of the parties" to the ex-wife,
however the ex-husband's financial interest would not become fixed until the home was
actually sold. I d Following the entry of the decree, the ex-wife placed the home on the
market and received an offer lower than she had hoped for. I d The ex-husband refused
to sign the necessary documents to close the sale believing that the home was worth more
than was offered. The trial court found that the ex-wife owned the property and that the
ex-husband had no right to participate in the sale and ordered him 1o sign the sale
documents. I d The Utah Supreme Court found that the decree did not award sole
ownership of the home to the ex-wife. The court found that a significant factor in
deciding that the husband still had an ownership interest in the home was that the decree
did "not award defendant a fixed amount which is secured by a lien on the property and
made payable at the time the property is sold . . . . Because his share was dependent on
the sales price eventually realized, he was vitally interested in any sale." I d at 771-772.
However the Supreme Court also noted that when the amount of a former spouses interest
in a home is fixed by the trial court, "[s]uch an arrangement would be wholly consistent
with full ownership in plaintiff [the ex-wife]. In such a case, defendant's only interest in
a sale would be that enough money was generated to pay his fixed award." I d at 772.
Based on those facts, the Booth court concluded that the decree was "more consistent and
reasonable if interpreted to mean that possession was awarded to plaintiff but ownership
remained jointly with the parties." I d In light of the fact that Hortin signed a listing
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agreement with Jones and that Hortin accepted several offers on the home and that she
also negotiated the terms of the option contract with Jones, there is a substantial question
as to what type of interest Bowen had in the property. In fact, following the filing of the
Notice of Appeal, Hortin filed additional documents in the trial court in which she claims
the sole right to recover the judgment obtained against Jones because she is the possessor
of the real property and has been solely responsible for the mortgage payments thereon.
The distinction made in Booth between a fixed interest and one that is subject to
change is of particular relevance to this case. The two step process contained in the
Bowen-Hortin decree contemplates that for so long as Bowen pays alimony, his interest
in the marital home can go up or down. However, once his alimony obligation ceased,
Bowen* s financial interest in the home would become fixed and at that point he would be
nothing more than a lien-holder awaiting payment of his share of the equity. What is fatal
to the trial court's decision is its failure to determine whether Bowen was still paying
alimony at the time Hortin signed the closing documents and the warranty deed in
November 1998. If Bowen's interest in the home was not fixed, he had an ownership
interest that would require his signature. If, on the other hand, his interest was fixed, full
ownership would be in Hortin and she would be able to convey the property by her
signature alone, subject to the payment of Bowen's lien interest. Because the trial court
did not receive this factual information, the case must be remanded for a determination of
Bowen's interest in the property and the need for him to sign any closing documents.
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B. Assuming That Bowen Had The Right To Approve Or Disapprove Of A
Proposed Transfer Of The Property, The Question Remains Whether He
Unreasonably Withheld That Approval

If Bowen does have an ownership interest in the home requiring his signature to
validate any sale, this case would still need additional review by the trial court. The
reason for this is that even if Bowen's signature is required to complete the sale of the
property, the trial court must also determine whether he unreasonably withheld his
signature. If so, his signature may be compelled. Booth provides guidance on this point
as well. In Booth, even though the appellate court found that the ex-husband had an
ownership right in the home, it still affirmed the lower court's order requiring him to sign
the sale documents. 722 P.2d at 772. The reason for affirmance was that even though the
ex-husband had a right to participate in the sale of the property, "he did not have the right
to unreasonable withhold his consent to a sale to a buyer found by plaintiff." IdL The
Booth court noted that the home had been listed for a period of approximately nine
months and the ex-husband had participated in decisions to decline prior offers. In
addition, the ex-husband in Booth made no effort to find a buyer who would pay more
nor had he shown that the terms of the sale were unreasonable or inequitable to the
parties. IdL
In this case, there is a significant question of fact as to whether Bowen acted
unreasonably. Based on information provided to the trial court, from the time that Hortin
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signed the original listing agreement until she signed the closing documents a period of
approximately twenty months passed (March 1997 to November 1998). Two prior sales
had fallen through for the price identified in the divorce decree as the estimated fair
market value of the home. Bowen was aware of the option agreement signed by Hortin
and Jones and even added his signature to that document. Although Bowen did sign the
first option agreement, the trial court did not receive evidence as to the reason why his
signature was obtained. The facts as previously alleged by Jones was that this signature
was obtained in order to avoid problems when closing as to the amount of the proceeds to
be distributed to Bowen from the sale. In addition, using the option agreement adopted
by the trial court, the option period ended in July 1998. Even using the option agreement
identified in the complaint the option period ended August 31, 1998. However, Jones
was not served with a five day notice to vacate until late November 1998 and the instant
action was not brought until December 1998. Both of these actions occurred after the
closing documents were signed by Hortin. The delay in bringing this action combined
with the fact that Bowen refused to sign the closing documents which would have paid all
past due rent suggests at least the possibility of unreasonableness on the part of Bowen.
This factual issue should also be addressed by the trial court in determining whether
Bowen could withhold his signature and terminate the sale of the home.
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II

HORTIN AND BOWEN'S ACTIONS CREATE A QUESTION OF FACT
AS TO WHETHER JONES' OPTION TO PURCHASE WAS
EXTENDED ORALLY OR THE CONTRACT WAS REMOVED FROM
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

There are additional disputed facts regarding whether appellant was given an
extension of the option to purchase the real property. Because an option to purchase real
estate is subject to the statute of frauds, ordinarily an extension of an option must also be
in writing. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1993), see also Utah Code
Ann. § 25-5-3 (1998). However, there are exceptions to this rule, and M[w]hen an oral
contract otherwise prohibited by the statute of frauds becomes enforceable because of part
performance or otherwise, the Statute doe not prevent the enforcement of the remaining
promises." Katsanevas, 854 P.2d at 580 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
A. Unresolved Facts Can Be Understood To Show That Jones Changed His
Position In Reliance On A Non-Written Extension To The Option Agreement
In affidavits provided to the trial court and on oral argument, Jones presented facts
suggesting that he had changed his position in reliance on oral modifications to the first
option agreement. A party seeking to enforce an oral modification may rely on the fact
that he has changed his position in defeating the statute of frauds.
If a party has changed his position by performing an oral modification so
that it would be inequitable to permit the other party to found a claim upon
the original agreement as unmodified or defeat the former's claim by setting
up a defense that performance was not according to the written contract,
after he has induced or consented to the former going forward, the modified
agreement should be held valid.
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Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions. Inc., 48 P.2d 489, 492 (1935), aff d on rehearing,
53 P.2d 1153 (1936). In Jones' Affidavit, he contended that Bowen had interfered with
the implementation of the lease and option agreement and that Hortin repeatedly agreed
that Jones could have more time to make improvements to the property and complete the
option agreement. Record at 71-73, ^ 14-19 (Jones Aff). If these facts are found to be
true, then Jones' efforts to improve the property beyond the option period of July 4, 1998,
would reflect that he had altered his position in reliance on oral statements and the efforts
by Bowen and Hortin to disaffirm the oral changes and require enforcement of the
original contract would be inequitable.
After hearing factual evidence, if the trial court were to determine that Bowen's
signature was necessary to effect a sale of the property, then his agreement vvould be
needed to extend the option period. The case of Coombs v. Ouzounian, greatly relied on
by Bowen in the trial court, stands for the proposition that when property is owned by
more than one person, all owners signatures are required to extend an option contract.
465 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1970). However, the factual dispute in this case, as identified
previously, is whether Bowen was even in a position to sign any documents with respect
to the property. If Bowen's signature was not needed, then Hortin could unilaterally
extend the option period. It is hard to see how Hortin could now argue that she did not
agree to extend the option period when she actually signed closing documents.
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B. Disputed Facts Have Not Been Resolved Regarding Whether Jones Partially
Performed The Non-Written Extension To The Option Agreement
The oral extension of Jones' option will also be exempt from a statute of frauds
defense if he can show partial performance under the oral extension. The statute of frauds
"shall [not] be construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific
performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof" Utah Code Ann. § 25-58 (1998). This exception to the statute of frauds has been interpreted to apply when
"there is 'sufficient performance on the part of [one party] exclusively referable to the
alleged contract to exempt it from the effect of the statute of frauds.'" Holt v. Katsanevas,
854 P.2d 575, 580 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Ryan v. Earl 618 P.2d 54, 55 (Utah 1980).
According to Jones' Affidavit, he performed sendees and improvements on the property
based on the extension of the option to purchase agreement and he also worked with a
financing company well beyond the July closing date identified in 1he option in an effort
to complete the transaction. Record at 71-73, ^ 14-20 (Jones Aff). Both of these
actions would not have been undertaken for any other reason other than the extension of
the option contract. The alleged facts surrounding the attempt to close the transaction
plainly show that there was at least part performance of the contract extension exclusively
referable to the extended option agreement thereby justifying removal of the contract
from the statute of frauds.
The larger question, however, is if Bowen did have an interest in the property
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requiring his signature, whether he is estopped from relying on the statute of frauds as a
defense to his failure to sign the closing documents Even Coombs recognizes that an
extension of an option agreement may be enforced in the absence of a writing if estoppel
is present 465 P 2d 358

Based on the facts available to the trial court, Bowen had

signed the first option and was aware of the dates contained therein Bowen was
presumptively aware of Jones' occupation and efforts on the property and Bowen's
decision to remain silent until after receiving the closing documents and refusing to sign
them indicates that he should not be allowed to rely on the statute of frauds to prosecute
his claim
C The Trial Court Ei / ed In Finding That Jones Was Not Entitled To Equitable
Relief Based On Unclean Hands
The trial court recognized that Bow en's interference with the closing of the
transaction may be a fact sensitive action Decision Hearing p 4 However, the trial
court went on to hold that because Tones did not make timely rental payments he was
therefore precluded from seeking equitable relief from the statute of frauds Id_ While
Jones did not contest this fact, the court failed to take into account that he had tendered
the back rent as part of the attempted closing This occurred prior to the service of the
five day notice to vacate and prior to his raising the defense of estoppel The Utah
Supreme Court has recognized that generally, "in a suit for specific performance of a
contract for the sale of realty, the purchaser must show that he paid the purchase price, or
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tendered it, to the defendant prior to the commencement of the suit." Reed v. Alvey, 610
P.2d 1374, 1379 (Utah 1980). In this case, there is evidence that this in fact occurred. In
his affidavit, Bowen alleges that Jones was two months delinquent in his rent at the end of
August 1998. At the time Hortin signed the closing documents, five moths would have
been due. Based on the contract rental rate of $648.00 per month, the amount owed
equaled $3,240.00. The Escrow Settlement Statement provided to the trial court ands
signed by Hortin, shows a line for an option payment to Hortin in the amount of
$3,240.00, the exact amount of the deficiency. The trial court's failure to recognize this
tender denied Jones of equitable relief that he at least arguable had a claim to. In order to
rectify this error, the case should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of
whether Bowen and Hortin, by their statements, actions, and silence, are estopped from
asserting the statute of frauds as a defense to the extension of the first option agreement
under either the theory of changed position or partial performance.

III.

BECAUSE HORTIN SIGNED CLOSING DOCUMENTS, A
SIGNIFICANT QUESTION OF FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER A
NEW CONTRACT BETWEEN HERSELF AND JONES CAME INTO
BEING OR WHETHER ANY PRIOR AGREEMENTS WERE MERGED
INTO THE WARRANTY DEED AND WHETHER BOWEN
UNREASONABLY WITHHELD HIS SIGNATURE.

Even if the facts in dispute show that Jones was not entitled to rely on the option
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contract, the trial court should still have heard evidence as to whether by signing closing
documents, Hortin thereby entered into a new and binding contract with Jones or his
assignee for the sale and purchase of the property. If Hortin did in fact do so, and if
Bowen had more than a financial interest in the property, the trial court must also
determine if Bowen was justified in his refusal to accept this new contract. Bowen and
Hortin have argued below that because the option expired by its terms and because they
believe that Jones could not prove an extension to the option nor could he prove the
elements of estoppel, that therefore, he had not right to remain on the property. However,
this argument ignores the fact that a new contract may have been formed or that by
signing closing documents, the option was merged with the warranty deed.
A. By Signing Closing Documents, Hortin May Have Entered Into A New
Contract To Sell The Property
The deed signed by Hortin, together with the closing documents, evidence material
facts that a new and binding contract for the sale of land had been entered into. A partial
list of elements required to establish a contract for the sale of land is contained in
Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1989). The list in
Roberts includes: (1) an adequate description of the property to be sold; (2) evidence of
consideration or of a purchase price; and (3) information regarding when and where
settlement shall occur. kf at 978. Other elements of a valid land contract would likely
include identification of the parties to the contract, words indicating an intent to sell and
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the signature of the seller. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1998). ]f these elements are
found to be present in a document or related documents, then a court should determine
that a valid and binding contract for the sale and purchase of property exists.
In this case, even if Jones and Hortin had not entered into a prior option
agreement, the existence of these elements in subsequent documents would establish a
completely separate contract for the sale of the property. The trial court did not take any
evidence as to whether the closing documents signed and submitted by Hortin in this case
met these elements. Its reason for not examining this issue was likely that because
Bowen had not signed the documents, it was immaterial what Hortin had done or signed.
However, this assumption is erroneous. The first reason that this is error is based on
Bow en's interest in the property. If he had only a financial interest, as described above,
he would not need to sign any of the sales documents. In addition, even if he had a more
general ownership interest, he may still be compelled to sign Ihe documents based on the
unreasonableness standard of Booth. Booth, 722 P.2d 772. In affirming the requirement
set by the lower court that the unreasonable spouse sign sale documents, the Booth court
recognized the importance of not allowing a former spouse to hold a transaction hostage.
"Plaintiff [willing spouse], too, was interested in having the properly sold, and her rights,
as well as those of defendant's [unreasonable spouse], must be considered.'1 IcL Thus,
even if Hortin had accepted the terms present here in November 1998 from an individual
with whom she had had no prior contact, there would be a material issue of fact as to
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whether a contract had been created which, assuming Bowen had an ownership interest in
the property, Bowen would have been required to accept.

B. Hortin 's Signature On The Closing Documents May Have Served To Merge All
Prior Agreements Into The Warranty Deed
By signing a warranty deed and delivering it to the title company chosen by Jones,
Hortin may have invalidated any argument that Jones was in violation of the option and
lease agreement because any prior obligations under those documents were merged into
the deed. Under the doctrine of merger, "upon delivery and acceptance of a deed, the
provisions of the underlying contract for the conveyance are deemed extinguished or
superseded by the deed." G.G.A.. Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 84L 844 (Utah App. 1989).
In addition, the deed itself essentially serves as a final real estate contract and n[p]arties to
real estate transactions must ensure that any agreements involving conveyance of title are
incorporated into the final closing document, which is usually a warranty deed."
Mavnard v. Wharton. 912 P.2d 446, 450-451 (Utah App. 1996). Again, in this case, the
trial court did not analyze the role of the merger doctrine because Bowen had not signed
the closing documents including the warranty deed. However, for the same reasons
identified in the new contract argument, the trial court erred and should have conducted a
factual investigation into whether any alleged problems with the option or lease
agreement were merged into the final signed documents and whether Bowen should be
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required to sign the closing documents.
The doctrine of merger does have four exceptions which would preclude
application of the doctrine. These are (1) mutual mistake in the drafting of final
documents, (2) ambiguity in the final documents, (3) existence of rights collateral to the
contract of sale and (4) fraud in the transaction. Id However, each of these exceptions
also require factual development before they may be invoked. Because the deed
presented to the trial court did not contain any exceptions to the transfer of title, this case
should be remanded for an assessment of whether the merger doctrine extinguishes any
claim that Jones' or Harrison was not entitled to purchase the property because the option
agreement had expired.

CONCLUSION
The rights retained by Bowen following the entry of the decree of divorce and at
the time the closing documents on the home were signed are contested and require further
review. Because the trial court did not determine the nature of Bowen's interest in the
home by receiving facts, it is unclear whether or not his signature was required to close
the sale of the home. This case should be remanded to the trial court for that
determination as well as a determination of all other matters, as described above, which
would follow a finding that Bowen either had or did not have an ownership interest in the
home. If Bowen did an ownership interest in the home, the trial court must determine
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whether the statute of frauds is inapplicable due to equitable principles, and, even if the
statute of frauds did apply to void the non-written extension to the option, whether Bowen
unreasonably withheld his consent to a completely new or merged transaction.

DATED this Z _ day of March, 2000.
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MiRK H. STRATFORD c [_y
Attorney for Appellant Teak D. Jones
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I, Mark H. Stratford, certify that on the 1
day of March, 2000,1 served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF APPELLANT TEAK D. JONES, upon the
following named individuals, appellee Hortin and counsel for appellee Bowen in this
matter, by mailing it by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following
address:

ROGER F. BARON
Attorney for Appellee Michael Bowen
45 North 100 East
Brigham City, Utah 84302

KRISTEN HORTIN
Appellee
2614 N. 700 E.
North Ogden, Utah 84404

HJH-^

Mark H. Stratford
^
Attorney for Appellant Teak D. Jones
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ADDENDUM A
BOWEN AFFIDAVIT

ROGER F. BARON #0225
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
45 NORTH 100 EAST
BRIGHAM CITY, UT 84302
(435) 734-9464

W\ \!1

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL BOWEN & KRISTEN HORTIN,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.

,

'

-

"•••'

""W *

TEAK D. JONES,
Case No. 980908407

O N & BARON
derson

Defendant.

iQron

at Low
FTrit Eosl

ily, Uloh 84302
734-9464
734-9151

Plaintiff Michael Bowen, having been duly sworn on oath, hereby states as follows:
1. On or about the 5th day of May. 1998. Plaintiffs and defendant executed an agreement
entitled LEASE AND OPTION TO PURCHASE as set forth in the Memorandum.
2. The term of the lease was stated to be March 1, 1998 to August 31, 1998. Said lease
further provided for lease payments of $648.00 per month and specified that time was of the
essence.
3. There was never an agreement in writing between all parties to extend the lease or
option.
4. The defendant failed to make all the lease payments due under the lease. Funher. the
defendant did not exercise his option prior to the August 31, 1998 deadline.
5. On November 25, 1998, the defendant attempted to assign his expired interest in the
BOWEN VS JONES
97-119

1

^

lease and option to purchase to a Diana Marie Harrison as per the exhibit to the Memorandum.
6. Also on November 25, 1998, the plaintiffs mailed a 5 day notice to vacate to the
Weber County Sheriff to be served on the defendant. This notice was served by the Weber
County Sheriff by posting the same on the door of the residence on November 30th, 1998 and
mailing a copy of the same by mailing to the defendant on December 1, 1998.
7. On December 16, 1998, the Defendant was served with the Complaint and Summons
in the present matter and subsequently posted a counterbond.
8. In November of 1998, the defendant attempted to exercise his option by selling the
property to a third party. As mentioned above, the defendant later assigned his interest in the
RSON & BARON
underson
Barcn
/i at Law
h First East
i Gfy, Utah 84302
5) 7 3 4 - 9 4 6 4
5)734 9151

lease and option to a different 3rd party. As part of that transaction, the defendant proposed to
pay past lease payments (thereby admitting that he had not paid all lease payments due under the
agreement.)

No document accepting the attempted late exercise was ever drafted or signed and

the defendant has never paid the past due payments.
9. The defendant was in default on rent as of the last dav of the lease in the amount of
$i/ZfH£$r

The defendant has paid no rent since that date and the plaintiffs are entitled to a

reasonable amount for rent in the amount specified in the contract to the present date of
$ ZZ Vo —
Dated this /_$_ day of

C5~ —

y ^ - ^ * C t ^ 7 ^~~~ J><
MICHAEL BOWEN
PLAINTIFF
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /JMay of January, 1999.

NOTARY PU3LIC
WARJLYN EVANS
45 Ncrrn «C0 Eos*
Brg.^iT. C tv, 1:7 3-V_v
Viy CcrrvP'ssic.^ ~ -- ,.,'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING £> e 1i% * <LY^
I hereby certify that I-maile&a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT this /jT^fey of
^J tLmLCLrs)
197 7postage prepaid to the following:

}N & BARON
lerson
jron
rsl East

y, Ulah 84302
34 9464
34 9151

CHAD B. MCKAY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2650 WASHINGTON BLVD., SUITE 10
OGDEN.UT 84401
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ADDENDUM B
JONES AFFIDAVIT

CHAD B.McKAY #5515
Attorney for Defendant
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 101
Ogden,UT 84401
':
Telephone: (801) 621-6021
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' -'
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL BOWEN & KRISTEN HORTIN
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
TEAK D.JONES,

„_

-

Defendant.

" •

•

-

: •

Case No: 980908407
Judge:
STATE OF UTAH
)ss:
COUNTY OF WEBER
TEAK D. JONES, being first duly sworn, deposes upon his oath and states as
follows:
I am the Defendant in the above entitled action and that all statements contained
in this affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
I assert that the facts surrounding this case are as follows:
j .

On or about March 6, 1997, acting as agent for Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, I listed
the subject property for sale as part of another listing with a St. George property.
(See Exhibit A)
Over the course of the next several months, there were two accepted offers on the
subject property for the sales price of SI 35,000, both of which failed. On both
offers Plaintiff Kristen Hortin, signed as the seller.

•;

5.

Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, has authorization granted to her by her Decree of
Divorce to be the only person authorized to sell the home. Plaintiff, Michael
Bowen was ordered in the parties Decree of Divorce to execute and deliver all
documents necessary to effect a property transfer. (See Exhibit B)

6.

The first and original lease option was signed by Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, in
December of 1997, which gave a lease period from January of 1998 until July of
1998, with an option to purchase granted by the seller. (See Exhibit C)

Plaintiff,

Michael Bowen, signed and delivered the original agreement in mid to late
February.
7.

Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, was attempting to purchase a new town home in St.
George, Utah. The builder was holding the town home for her and required the
sale or lease of the subject property in order for her to qualify for financing.

8.

Said listing contract expired with the failure of the previously mentioned sales.
However, I offered to purchase the property under a lease with option to purchase
arrangement. The option price would be approximately equivalent to the amount
Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin. would have received net after commissions and closing
costs from the prior mentioned sales.

9.

Thus, Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, could now complete the financing for the purchase
of her new town home, and I, having now worked on it for six months, might
salvage an amount equivalent to a commission upon resale of the property. Also,
now with the property vacated, some of the needed repairs that had hampered our
previous marketing efforts could be accomplished.

10.

In about mid November of 1997, it was agreed between Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin,
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and myself that we would execute the afore mentioned lease option agreement,
and that I would take immediate possession to begin the needed repairs and
marketing of the property. Thus, giving me a head start of 1Y2 months prior to any
payment obligation.
11.

It was also agreed that Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, would secure the signatures of her
ex-husband, Michael Bowen, on the lease option agreement. The signature of
Michael Bowen was not legally necessary, but was for the purpose of insuring his
cooperation, as he had twice previously tlireatened to stop her in her efforts to sell
the property. Further, his signature would establish an agreement on the value of
the subject property as specified in the parties Decree of Divorce, which would
protect Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, from being later damaged by an appraisal, done
after repairs were completed, in higher than the selling price.

12.

As part of the original lease option agreement, there was a proposal to improve
the property, which I agreed to and attempted to begin by hiring a workman and
advancing him cash for the necessary materials.

13.

I later learned that Plaintiff, Michael Bowen, the ex-husband of the legal seller,
Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, had expelled the repair man that I hired to make
improvements on the subject property. Having had my workman ran off and
having not received final signed copies of the agreement back, I moved on to
other commitments.

14.

Then approximately late February, I finally received back the original agreement
signed by all parties. I reiterated to Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, that now that time
has passed, we would need to extend our agreement and that the monies I had set
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aside for repairs and payments had been used elsewhere, and I would need to
remake those arrangements. Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin expressed that she still
wanted me to go ahead with the property and that she understood additional time
would be needed.
15.

Thus, May of 1998, was the first time that I had accessability to the property.
Therefore, in effect by our actions, we had moved forward the lease option to May
even though it was dated back in December.

16.

I made two months payments in April totaling SI380. I then made another two
months payments on June 17 totaling SI300. Thus, by our actions, we had begun
the deal that was originally scheduled to start January in May due to Michael
Bowen's actions. I was more than willing to abide by the original agreement in
January when it was signed, but, Plaintiff, Michael Bowen, interfered by expelling
my repairman, removing my Realtor's sign and lockbox, and not conveying
cooperation by acceptance until mid to late February.

17.

When I tried to go in and make the improvements the second time as requested by
Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, once again the meddling ex-spouse, Michael Bowen,
stepped in and stated that he was going to keep my money even though he had no
legal standing either to consent to or to object to the agreement. (See Exhibit B The Decree of Divorce)

18.

Once again Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, stated that she wanted me to follow through
with the original agreement. Therefore, I started making the rental payments and
began making the improvements on the property as requested by Plaintiff, Kristen
Hortin.

BOWEN & HORTIN v. JONES
Case No.: 9S090S407

Page 4

19.

Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, continued to reaffirm with me on a regular basis, up until
November of 1998 when she actually closed with me and complied with her intent
to sell the property to me, as the only authorized person to make that deal.

20.

The delay in closing was due to the financier's inability to get the loan closed
timely. Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin actually signed the closing documents in
November.

21.

At the time of the November closing, the lender stated, in order for him to close
the loan and obtain financing for me, he needed to establish a paper trail of our
agreement.

22.

It was at that time, not in May of 1998, but rather in November of 1998, that the
lender presented the second lease document, upon which the Plaintiffs exclusively
rely.

Even though said document is dated in May, it was not signed by me until

November.
23.

Said document was never negotiated by me, there was never a meeting of the
minds, we had never come to accord as to what the terms would be. It wras simply
presented to me, strictly and solely, as a requirement for me to be able to close the
loan.

24.

Said document was signed at closing, in November of 1998, for the sole purpose
of leaving a "paper trail" so that the lender could check the box on his lender form
stating that he had obtained that information. Said document is null and void and
fraudulent and it was signed for a different purpose than Plaintiffs are now
alleging. There was no meeting of the minds as it was signed strictly for
financing purposes. Further, It was never agreed upon as a binding agreement
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between us.
25.

Further affiant sayth not.

DATED this _ ^ ^ f d a y of January, 19 ? ?.
^P

TEAK JONES
Defendant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ T ^ a y of January, 1999.

NOTARY PUBtlC

403 Wast 2525 Norm
Sunsst,UT84015
'v Commission Expires
:.7ecsrr-ber12f 2C01
"^r^ OF UTAH
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Addendum C

ADDENDUM C
SELECTED PORTIONS OF DIVORCE DECREE

insurance coverage.

Neither parent shall contract for nor incur any obligation for orthodontic

work or elective surgery for the child, or any type of psychological counseling or evaluation for a
child without the prior agreement or consent of the other parent in writing. The non-custodial
parent will have the right in advance to have a say in the selection of doctors and procedures for
any and all orthodontic, surgery procedures or psychological counseling.
The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the
other parent upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January
2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent of any change of insurance
carrier, or benefits within thirty (30) calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known
of the change
8. ALIMONY. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of $630,00 per month
for alimony beginning August 1, 1995 until such time as the Plaintiff remarries, graduates from
college or acquires full time employment, but not to exceed five years from the date August I,
1995 or August 1,2000.
These payments are taxable to the payee and deductible to the payor,
9

SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. Plaintiff is awarded those Social Security

Benefits she is entitled to as a spouse of the Defendant for over ten (10) years.
10.

PERSONAL PROPERTY OF PLAI&TIEE. Plaintiff is awarded those items of

personal property currently in her possession, together with ber personal belongings and effects.
11

PERSONAL PROPERTY OF DEFENDANT. Defendant is awarded those items

of personal property currently in his possession, together with his personal belongings and effects.
12.

REAL PROPERTY. Plaintiffis awarded possession of the residential home and

DCV/GN V 9CWEN
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real property located at 2614 North 700 East, North Ogden, Utah, 84414 A legal description of
r

the property is attached as Exhibit A.

0 3
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The home has an approximate appraised value of $135,000. w , and a mortgage bidancc of
$65,000.00. The parties agree that the Defendant shall maintain an interest in the home until such
time as the home is sold or alimony ceases as set forth in Paragraph 13 above. At such lime the
home will be valued by the parties, by appraisal or otherwise as agreed. Defendant shall be
awarded a non-interest bearing lien in the sum equal to one-half the equity in the home at the rime
of appraisal which shaU be paid to the defendant upon the occurrence of any one of the following
conditions:
(a)

Plaintiffs remarriage;

(b)

Plaintiffs death;

(c)

Sale of the home;

(d)

Six (6) months after the eighteenth birthday of the youngest child of the

parties, or July 10,2008;

13.

(e)

If the Plaintiff shall co-habitat with a member of the opposite sex; or

(f)

Cessation of the use of the home as the primary residence.

DEBTS OF PLAINTIFF. The plaintiff shall assume and discharge the following

debts: Balance of £700.00 due Weber State Credit Union on the station wagon, Key Bank, Home
Equity Loan, balance 51,000.00; Bank One, Home Equity, balance $350.00; Pete Christensen,
DDS, dentist bill, balance $210.00; those debts incurred since the parties' separation of July 15,
1995, and to indemnify, defend and hold the defendant harmless therefrom.
Plaintiff shall also assume responsibility for the mortgage loan payment on the marital
BCW5N v. scwe*
P»g»5
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residence and acknowledges and agrees that alimony, in part, received pursuant to the Stipulation
and Property Settlement Agreement and this Decree shall be used for makingtimelymortgage
payments.
14.

DEBTS OF DEFENDANT. The defendant shall assume and discharge the

following debts, those debts he has incurred since the parties' separation of July 15, 1995, and to
indemnify, defend and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom.
15

NQTTCE OF DEBTS The parties shall provide a certified copy of the Final

Decree of Divorce to aU creditors of the parties pursuant to the Utah Code .Ann §§ 30-3-5(l)(c)
and 15-4-6 5, and do aay follow-up necessary to effectuate these statutes. With respect to either
party who is not ordered to make payments under U.C.A §§ 30-3-5 and 30-4-3 on the joint
obligations, no negative credit report under U C A § 7QC-7-107 and no report of the debtor's
repayment practices or credit history under Chapter 14, Tftle 7, Credit information Exchange,
may be made regarding the joint obligation after the creditor is served notice of the Couit's order
as required under U C.A. § 15-4-6 5(2), unless the creditor has made a demand on the joint
obligor not ordered to pay the debt for payment because of the failure to make payments by the
joint obligor ordered to make the payments
16

COBRA. The defendant shall assist the plaintiff in obtaining medical benefits for

the plaintiff through defendant's place of employment for a divorced spouse, as provided by Title
X of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Art (COBRA) 1985 The plaintiff is
responsible for payment of the insurance premiums for such coverage. All expenses not covered
by insurance shall be the sole responsibility of the plaintiff for payment. The defendant is further
required to make available to plaintiff all necessary forms and documents to effectuate the same
cfc^se or ^vc»c£
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for submission to the appropriate agencies.
17.

LIFE INSURANCE. The defendant shall maintain a life insurance policy listing

the minor children as beneficiaries, in an amount sufficient to cover child support in the event of
the defendant's death, as long as it is available through his place of employment, with the
provision that should the defendant remarry and have additional children, those children can be
listed as co-beneficiaries in equal amounts.
18.

TAX RETURN. The plaintiff and defendant shallfilea joint tax return for the tax

year 1995.
19.

INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS. Defendant is awarded the minor children for

income tax deduction purposes so long as he is paying child support. However, the defendant can
only claim the minor children for income tax deduction purposes if he is current in his child
support payments for the year in which he is claiming the deductions. The plaintiff will waive her
rights therein if all provisions are met, and sign the necessary annual waiver with the Internal
Revenue Service, Form 8332.
M such time as plaintiff becomes gainfully employed, the parties agree that the tax
deduaions shall be split between the parties with defendant claiming the oldest and youngest child
and plaintiff claiming the middle child as dependents.
If the physical custody of one or more of the children changes, the parties agree to revisit
the issues of child support and tax deductions.
20.

TAXES. Each of the parties is responsible for and liable for any tax implications

for those properties acquired through this Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement.
21.

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY. Each party or their heirs or assigns shall

OeCREE Cf CXYCKCE
BCwav v aowiN
PJQ»7
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immediately deliver all personal property awarded to the other party in their possesion, and
execute and deliver all documents and titles necessary to effect a property transfer as ordered in
the Decree of Divorce to be entered herein.
22.

PLAINTTFFS MAIDEN NAME. Plaintiffs maiden name of Hortin shall be

restored to her upon entry of the Decree of Divorce.
23

ATTORNEYS FEES Defendant shall pay attorney'sfeesin the total amount of

5600.00, and all costs incurred for this action.
DATED this / / d a y of

f

/sfr6*f

, 199<5

DISTRICT C t f U ^ M ^ E
Approved As to Form:

MICHAEL W. BOWEN
Defendant

DECRK OF DJVC*!CS
8CWENY BC*v£N

RPR-21-1997

14^42

601 479 8684

P.09

Addendum D

ADDENDUM D
OPTION AGREEMENT AND SELECTED CLOSING DOCUMENTS
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TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY INC.

ESCROW SETTLEMENT STATEMENT
SELLER'S COPY
FILE NO 2-12792A
ESCROW NO 2-12792A
DATED 11/12/98
PRORATED TO 11/13/98
BUYER DIANA HARRISON
SELLER MICHAEL W BOWEN AND KRISTEN H BOWEN
BROKER
PROPERTY ADDRESS 2614 NORTH 700 EAST, OGDEN, UT
SELLERS MAILING ADDRESS , OGDEN, UT
TYPE OF TRANSACTION

84414

$
$
$
$

125 500 00
3 240 00
100 00
128,840 00

886 64
696 00
$

1,5 82 64

$

127,2 57 36

61,016 95
20,205 2$
95 00
. $

81 31/ 24

$

45,940 12

PURCHASE PRICE
OPTION PA/MENT
LA^E FEES
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE AND CREDITS DUE SELLER
LESS CREDITS TO BUYER
TAXES ASSUMED 01/01/98 TO 11/13/98 Q$
TITLE INSURANCE PAID BY BUYER
TOTAL CREDITS TO BUYERS

1,024 12

$
$
.

NET EQUITY BEFORE EXPENSES
EXPENSES OF THE SELLER
PAYOFF LOAN TO COUNTRYWIDE
PAYOFF 2nd LOAN TO ADAMS
CLOSING FEE TO AV^S & ARCHIBALD TITLE INS
TOTAL EXPENSES FOR SELLER ...
NET DUE TO SELLER
THE U N D E R S I G N E D
IE L U 8 L E

AGENC/

$
$
TtfC$

. .

BT THE S 1 0 W J W 0 OF THIS D O C U H E V T

HERESY A C K N O W L E D G E RECEIPT OF A COPT OF THE SAME A N D A G U E TO

FOR A N D MOID TITLE C O M P A N T H A R M L E S S M O M AXY / O O f T I O V A L C H A R G E S R E L A T I N G

HOT CiISCLOSED IN THIS S T A T E M E N T
OTHER SIMILAR

BY AMY L l f N H O L D E *

TO TKE A 8 0 V E R E F E R E N C E D

3E H H O R T G A G E P A T O ' F S OR A S S U M P T I O N F I G U R E S

ASSESSMENTS

*

QRI.I.FP 3^
SELLER

PROPERTY

TAXES A M D / O R

v

NORTH OGDEH, UT

WARRANTY DEED
2-12792A
MICHAEL W. BOWiEN AND KRISTEN H. BOWEN,
GRAJJTORS
of OCDEN, C o u n t y of WEBER, S t a t e of UT,
h e r e b y CONVEYS ANTj WARRANTS TO

DIANA HARRISON

GRANTEE
of , NORTH OGDEN, UT
for the cum of Ten dollars and other good ^nd valuable cortsidcra:ion.
The following tract of land in WEBER County, State of Utah, to-vit18-01.1-0006
THE NORTH 8S FEET OF LOT 3. BLOCK 14, FLAT A. NORTH OGDEN SURVEY
WEBER COUNTY. UTAH

Subject to easements restrictions and rights of ^ay
appearing of record or enforceable in law and equity and 1998
taxes and thereafter.

WITNESS the hands of said Grantors this 12th day of November, 1998

MICHAEL W. BOW5N

~^^^^SAUAK^_
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

KRISTEN H. BOWEN

)
:SS
>

ON THE 12th DAY OF NOVEMBER
. A D 1998. PERSONALLY
APPEARED BEF0R5 ME' MICHAEL W. BOWEN AND KRISTEN H. BOWEN,
THE SIGNER(S) OP THE
WITHIN INSTRUMENT, VfliO DULY ACKNOWLEDGED TO *Z THAT TH£Y_
EXECUTED THE SAME.

/SB
^UjkmLlE BENNETT
HOrWPWKiSWclUM
837 SOUTH 900 EAST

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:12/11/99

S I O f O I I O E . UTU4790
COMM. EXP. 2-10-2001
si
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ADDENDUM E
ORAL ARGUMENT HEARING TRANSCRIPT

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL BOWEN & KRISTIN HORTIN,

Case No. 980908407

Plaintiff,
v
TEAK D. JONES,
Defendant.

DECISION HEARING HELD MAY 9, 1999
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN

COPY
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
652 Jefferson Cove
Sandy, Utah 84070
801-567-1157

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

ROGER F. BARON
BUNDERSON & BARON
45 North 100 East
Brigham City, Utah 84302

For the Defendant:

CHAD B. MCKAY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2350 Washington Blvd
Ogden, Utah 84401
* * *

1
2

April 9, 1999
HONORABLE PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN PRESIDING

3
4

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

All right.

This is in the matter

5

of Bowen versus Jones, number 980908407.

It's the

6

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Just to let you

7

know I had, I was gone the last part, of last week and we

8

had checked to see if there was anything on the calendar

9

and they said there wasn't.

So I didn't get this file to

10

review until just this morning and I had other matters.

11

have, you know, given it a cursory review.

12

the basic issues.

13

whole factual scenario.

14

little, not totally clear about.

15

complicated about what happened when.

16

complicated set of facts forth in the memorandum in

17

opposition.

18

that completely.

19

to purchase.

20

contention is that it expired or something and I guess that

21

the other contention is that it was not an arm's length

22

kind of agreement where it was a valid agreement and

23
24
25

I

I understand

I'm not really sure I understand the
That's the only thing I'm a
Apparently, it's fairly
It was a fairly

And I'd just say, I haven't really digested
I understand there was a lease and option

There may have been more than one.

MR. BARON:

The

—

Yeah, but the second lease it was an

arm' s length agreement.

THE COURT:

So the;re \rferetwo?

1

1

MR. BARON:

Right.

The first lease, I don't

2

think there is any dispute that all the parties agreed on

3

that.

4

that he only signed that later on as for a lender or

5

something.

6
7

The second lease, the defendant is alleging anyway,

THE COURT:

Okay.

The first lease also had an

option to purchase?

8

MR. BARON:

Yes.

9

THE COURT:

And that was signed by the defendant?

10

MR. BARON:

Yes.

11

THE COURT:

And when did that expire?

12

MR. BARON:

I believe that was in July of last

14

THE COURT:

July of ^98?

15

MR. BARON:

Right.

13

16
17
18

year.

It expired earlier than the

second option that he is saying that THE COURT:

And it's your contention that the

option was never perfected?

19

MR. BARON:

Well, it was never exercised.

20

THE COURT:

Never exercised?

21

MR. BARON:

Yes.

Your Honor, I do have one case

22

that I found after I submitted my last reply.

23

counsel a copy of it.

24

have a copy for the Court.

25 I

THE COURT:

I have given

If I may approach the bench, I do

Okay. Thank you.
2

1
2

Having said that then, I'll let you, you know,
present what you have to present but -

3

MR. BARON:

Thank you, your Honor.

It is rather

4

a complex situation.

5

that been owned by a husband and wife who then divorced.

6

The husband and wife did sign an option agreement with the

7

defendant in about, I believe it was December of

8

option with, a lease with an option is what it was.

9

1998, I was made aware of the situation, reviewed that, was

What we had was a home here in Ogden

x

97, an
In

10

not really happy with how clear it was worded and so I

11

redid it and gave it to the parties and that was signed by

12

all the parties although the defendant is now saying that

13

that wasn't signed by him until later and he claims it was

14

just an accommodation but it was a lease and it was an

15

option.

16

last year, the second one the end of August.

17

The first option did expire I believe in July of

It's undisputed in the facts that the defendant

18

did nothing to exercise his option on either lease prior to

19

the expiration.

20

defendant has not paid all the money that is due under the

21

lease.

22

residence for approximately the last six or eight months

23

rent free and not having made any lease payments.

24

It's also undisputed on the facts that the

That as a matter of fact he has been living in that

Following the expiration of the option, the

25 J defendant continued to live there for some period of time
3

1

and about October or November of last year he attempted to

2

exercise his option by finding a buyer and essentially

3

wanted to have the buyer purchase it and then use some of

4

that money to pay his last or his behind lease payments.

5

It's rather curious because at the same time that he was

6

doing this he actually assigned his option to a third party

7

and the third party was supposed to go ahead and sell the

8

premises and I suppose pay the lease payments.

9

there's, in the record, a copy of that assignment which is

10

interesting because the defendant now appears he is living

11

in the home and yet he's assigned any interest he has in

12

the lease and option.

13

had expired months previous.

14
15
16

But

Of course, the lease and the option

THE COURT:

When was that assignment attempted to

MR. BARON:

The assignment was later.

be made?
It was at

17

the same time he attempted to exercise the option in around

18

November of last year.

19

the assignment.

20
21

THE COURT:

And there is a copy in the file of

Okay.

There probably is and I just

didn't have all the bullets in line so.

22 I

MR. MCKAY:

November, what was that date?

23 I

MR. BARON:

November llrh.

Okay.

And so the

24

defendant appears here living in the premise having

25

assigned his right to the option and lease, his main

1

contention, I believe, is that he tried to exercise the

2

option that one of the two persons whose name appears on

3

the title, Kristen Hortin, he alleges assigned, signed some

4

document having to do with the sale of the property.

5

have never seen a copy of that document.

6

any allegation that there was ever anything signed

7

extending the option.

8

Court is Coombs versus—and I'm not sure how to pronounce

9

this--Ozmiun, covers a couple of thiags that I think are at

I

I don't know of

The case that I presented to the

10

least relevant to this case.

One is that it makes clear

11

that options are covered by the statute of frauds.

12

extension of that option would have had to be in writing

13

signed by the parties.

14

is not even any allegation that there ever was anything

15

like that.

16

to the option.

We have nothing Like that.

Any

There

And so there could not have been an extension

17

The second thing that covers, this case was an

18

interesting factual case and somewhat similar to what we

19

have here.

20

an option to a third party, it came time for the option to

21

expire and one of the, I can't remember if it was the

22

husband or wife, but one of them signed actually an

23

extension and said I'm going to give you an extension on

24

the option.

It involved a husband and wife that had given

The other, once again it was the husband or

25 J wife, did not sign the extension agreement.

The Court held
5

1

that the assignment was not valid and that both parties did

2

not sign it.

3

neither party signed an extension.

4

statutes of frauds but even if Kristen Hortin had signed an

5

extension, that doesn't extend the option in that the

6

parties, all the parties to the option of the lease did not

7

sign.

And here we have an ex-husband and wife and
Clearly subject to the

8

So, your Honor, my clients are very frustrated.

9

They've had this man living in the home rent free for all

10

this time and they would like the Court to issue summary

11

judgment, order him out of the home.

12

issue on past rent, we've alleged that.

13

in our affidavit.

14

later hearing.

15

regard to that and it can be determined under the affidavit

16

and the facts alleged.

17

summary judgment, that we have an Order of the Sheriff to

18

move the defendant from the premises.

If the Court sees an
We've covered it

Certainly we could handle that at a

We don't think there is any issue with

So we would ask that we be granted

Thank you.

19

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

20

MR. MCKAY:

Thank you, your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

Good morning.

22

MR. MCKAY:

I think it's important that the Court

Good morning.

23

understand all of the facts here.

Counsel has made some

24

representations and some of that is true, but I guess to

25 J make a legal decision I think the Court needs to understand
6

1

everything that has happened.

This is a husband and wife,

2

both of them are the plaintiffs.

3

when but prior to this time and the wife was given all the

4

interest in the marital property subject to a lien by the

5

husband for equity.

6

right to sell the property.

7

agent.

8

anyway, he does real estate work and he had arranged for

9

this woman to receive a condo to buy, purchase a

Divorced, I don't know

So she, therefore, had all of the
My client is a real estate

He, I don't know if he's a broker or an agent, but

10

condominium in St. George.

11

think her name is Kristen Hortin.

12

this deal she needed to sell her home.

13

this particular home that my client is now living there.

14

So, he was accommodating her.

15

St. George, he had to help her sell her home here and so

16

the home was listed and had two potential purchasers.

17

of those deals fell through because the property wasn't

18

quite up to standard to sell.

19

will buy the property or I'll rent the property and buy it

20

and I'll fix it up and then we'll sell it and we'll go

21

ahead and finish all these deals including your one in St.

22

George.

23

lease with the option to purchase.

24
25

Okay, one of the plaintiffs.

I

And when, as part of
The home that is

To make this deal work in

Both

So, my client said fine, I

And that's the December agreement and it was a

Mr. Bowen, another one of the plaint iffs , the exspouse, we'll call h im the meddling spouse in this case.
7

1

He came in and basically ran my client's repair person off.

2

The person that he had hired to go in and fix the place up

3

so that they could get it ready to sell.

4

goes to Kristen Hortin and says, Hey, you know, are you

5

going to have your ex do this or are you going to have me

6

do this because we're both not going to do it.

7

isn't going to work that way.

8

it, fine.

9

back away.

10

I'll do it.

So, my client

It just

You know, if I'm going to do

If he's going to do it.

I'll just

I've got other things to do.

So, after a month or two finally she decides

11

yeah, no, I definitely want you to go ahead and do it and

12

I'll get him out of it.

13

okay, this is definitely a go.

14

basically begin the document rather than in December they

15

started in the spring time.

16

April or May.

So, at that point my client says
Yes, it's a go.

So, they

I believe it was about March,

17

Help me, Teak.

18

It was April or May.

So, my client at that time

19

makes two rental payments which would carry him through

20

until an August date which, and then he moves in and he

21

starts to really try to get this place up to speed.

22

contacts a potential buyer.

23

he's in constant contact with Kristen. Okay, not with Mr.

24

Bowen, the meddling spouse.

25

the person that he believes to be the only person with

He

He works everything out and

He's in constant contact with

1

authority to sell this house.

This constant contact is

2

going up through November 11.

Okay?

3

arranged.

4

THE COURT:

He has financing

Now what was this arrangement that, I

5 J guess, we've got the written option from December.
MR. MCKAY:

Right.

in August is my understanding.

Did

—

And it is supposed to expire
The first agreement, okay.

And then he's got financing arranged and everything is a go
9 I and they're scheduled to close and the buyer, the new buyer
10

comes in the the new buyer signs all the closing document.

11

Kristen Hortin -

12

THE COURT:

And when was that again?

13

MR. MCKAY:

November 11th, I believe.

14

THE COURT:

Okay, this is in November.

15

MR. MCKAY:

Yes, it was attached, counsel said he

16

didn't get a copy of it.

17
18

THE COURT:

21

Yeah, I'm sure that it's in here.

I

just want to make sure I'm following you.

19
20

We attached it as an exhibit.

MR. MCKAY:

If there is something afterwards, you

can tell me.
And Kristen Hortin, one of the plaintiffs,

22

actually comes in at that date and signs all the closing

23

documents.

24

THE COURT:

25 I

MR. MCKAY:

For the sale to this new buyer.
Right, right.

And as part of the
9

1

financing, and this is where all of this gets muddled.

2

Okay.

3

ex-spouse, Mr. Bowen, is getting involved. And he says is

4

it still going to close, is it still going to close, is it

5

still going to close?

6

along.

7

Then at that point in order to close and get all the

8

financing worked out, the title, is he a title guy or is he

9

a finance guy?

To that point everybody is moving along, even the

Okay.

He's following everything

Doesn't object once.

Everything is going smoothly.

10

MR. JONES:

A finance.

11

MR. MCKAY:

The finance guy says we need to make

12

a paper trail so this thing is going to work on the

13

financing.

14

client is presented with this second lease option.

15

The second lease option actually expired by its terms two

16

months prior to the date that he even signed it.

17

there's a big question as to meeting of the minds and what

18

that purpose of that document was.

19

At that point, clear in November, is when my
Okay.

So

Now, counsel wants the Court to rely solely on

20

the face of that document but clearly any document signed

21

and any document that has expired two months prior to the

22

date of the signing and I don't think they're disputing

23

that he signed it that date, has got to be fraudulent on

24

its face and null and void.

Anyway, so in order to leave a

25 I paper trail he signs this second document so that he can
10

1

get financing and close, you know, within a week.

2

of that same agreement, as part of the closing on the

3

document and as part of the a, everything that needs to

4

happen so the financing can be completed.

5
6

THE COURT:

As part

Financing for this third person

that's buying it?

7

MR. MCKAY:

Right.

My client has to assign his

8

right because of his financial situation, he has to assign

9

his right to a third person.

This third person is actually

10

his wife, okay?

That's the assignment that counsel is

11

talking about.

He assigns it to her because she is in a

12

better financial condition to complete the financing.

13

mean he is working extremely hard to make this deal work

14

for all the parties.

15

except for Mr. Bowen.

16

Mr. Bowen.

17

person comes in and says, Mr. Bowen, you need to sign these

18

papers, okay, because he has some lien interest and he's

19

going to be, he has to agree to the amount that he is to

20

receive out of the equity.

21

That's, that's the point that he gets together with his

22

attorney or with the lender, the financier and they

23

basically conspire and say, Hey, we can cut him out of this

24

deal altogether.

I

And everybody is in agreement with it
Everybody has signed it except for

And at that point on the closing, the finance

He doesn't sign.

We know who the buyer is.

25 I signed so the deal doesn't go through.

Okay.

I haven't

We'll just evict
11

1

him and we' 11 take all the profits f:com this.

And we

2

r
alleiqe that that's exac:tly what they re trying to do.

3

my c:lient, he receives most of this information back f.rom

4

the buyer.

5

you' re not in this deal anymore, you know.

And

And the bu]yrer is saying, Well, Teak , how come
You 're the one

I've been d ealing with, we've been doing all th is all
along.

How come sudden ly you're out of it and this new,

this guy wants to just deal directly with me?
9
10
11

THE COURT:

What, they wanted to cut him out of

his sales commission?
MR. MCKAY:

Yeah.

Exactly.

My client and this

12

third party is actually his wife.

13

they did that strictly because he needed the clean credit

14

to do the financing.

15

scam basically to cheat him out of a sales commission.

16

we wanted to make sure we were clear here before we go and

17

file all of our, but we believe there have been several

18

violations of law and we intend to pursue those.

19

one, against Mr. Bowen for meddling and we indicated that

20

in our documents, for interfering with business interests

21

when he had no right to do so.

22

this lender who we believe has also violated the law.

23

She's, you know, and

We feel like the whole thing is a
And

Number

And number two, against

But as far as a summary judgment motion or

24

anything in that vane we just feel it would be

25

inappropriate.

There are so many complicated facts here
12

1

that we haven't had time today to explain to the Court and

2

that we would put on by testimony.

3

And, by the way, my client is here and is

4

prepared to testify if this Court wishes him to do so to

5

clarify anything or just so that we can have something on

6

the record under sworn.

7

THE COURT:

Let me just make sure I understand.

So there was lease with option to purchase signed in
December of ^97.
10

MR. MCKAY:

Yes.

11

THE COURT:

Expired probably in July or August.

12

MR. MCKAY:

Right.

And it didn't even begin, I

13

guess it was on paper but the terms of it didn't start

14

until several months after the time that they were supposed

15

to start.

16

THE COURT:

But, but did it expire in August?

17

MR. MCKAY:

Yes.

But I guess one of the points

18

that's important for the Court to understand is had he had

19

from December until July or Augus t to prepare the property

20

for sale, then he could have done that within that period

21

of time.

22

comes in and chases this person o ff and there is this much

23

confusion, he lost several months of time there to prepare

24

this property.

25

Augus>t, it kic:ked over irito Octob<er, November before he

But because Mr. Bowen, unclean hand;3 doctrine,

And that' s why it went, instead of July or

13

1

could have everything completed and finish the sale.

2

THE COURT:

But from August on, it is your

3

contention that there was no actual written lease with

4

option to purchase.

5

Is that

MR. MCKAY:

—

Well, and that, thank you, your

6

Honor, for reminding me about the statute of frauds.

What

7

I want to know or want the Court to a, I guess our defense

8

to the statute of frauds argument that counsel made is that

9

there is case law.

I didn't bring the cases today because

10

I didn't know that counsel was going to present these

11

arguments today.

12

exception to the statute of frauds if there are enough, and

13

it can be notes, it can be scratches on paper, it can be

14

documents.

15

terms of an extension, then the extension would apply.

16

We're saying that because Kristen Hortin actually signed

17

closing documents and although, even though she verbally

18

agreed to everything up until that point and actually by

19

her actions confirmed the extension period and even signed

20

closing documents, that those written document would create

21

the extension that would be the exception to the statute of

22

fraud.

23
24

But there is case law that allows an

If there are enough of those to establish the

MR. JONES:

You have the actual closing date was

vague because of a seven and a half month deal was now cut

25 I to a three month deal.
14

1

MR. MCKAY:

2

MR. JONES:

3

Right, that explains it.
And (inaudible) if I can't get it

done then and there's verbal

4

THE COURT:

—

Well, let me just hear from him.

5

I understand you may want to talk with him but it's not

6

going to help me to have you

—

7

MR. MCKAY:

Right.

8

THE COURT:

I just need it presented to me.

9

MR. JONES:

(Inaudible) responsible for those

10
11

closing

And

—
MR. MCKAY:

And there are other things.

It's not

12

just that, you know, he ran this person off.

There are a

13

lot of o~her problems that the plaintiff has created here.

14

You know, even getting the police involved with meddling

15

with the property and such.

16

still trying to be the controlling spouse even though there

17

is a divorce.

18

to sell 1:he property and do whatever.

19

whatever his portion of the equity is.

20

is the problem here.

21

because he has done that.

22

that and allow us to finalize.

23

in the near future to allow, to actually hold him as the or

24

his assignee as the true buyer.

We feel like, you know, he's

The decree of divorce gives her all rights
All he gets is
And that is really

That's why we're in Court today id
We would ask this Court to deny
We'll be asking the Court

Maybe there's a third

25 J party, a necessary third party that isn't here.
15

THE COURT:

1

Ok ay.

What is it,r is it a rent owing

2

from your point of view for a period of time while he's

3

been in the house but it ha sn't been sold, do you know?
MR. MCKAY:

4

It 's true that my client was paid, he
He made two double payments.

5 t paid the initial payment s.
6

And at the closing time in November, they proffered the

7

balance and that amount was refused and then they brought

8

this action for eviction.

9

they refused it.

So the money was proffered but

And then they or he did, I should say,

10

out of greed or for whatever other reason controlling an

11

ex-spouse has meddled in this whole thing.
THE COURT:

12
13

Is there some reason no lease with

option to buy was entered into when the other one expired--

14

MR. MCKAY:

I think what happened is and maybe

15

it f s because of all the verbal representations.

16

was going perfectly fine and, you know, the woman, Kristen,

17

was basically saying, yeah, I know my ex-spouse meddled and

18

so you couldn't do it and sof

19

ahead. And everything was moving along fine and everything

20

is going fine until, you know, even up until the signing of

21

all the documents and then the ex-spouse jumps in and

22

crashes tlle whole deal or gets greedy about taking h.is

23

portion.

24

questions standing in our documents> and I suppose they

25

have, too, as well , as far as that' s concerned and maybe

Everything

yeah, we're going to go

I don't know that, yeah, you know, when we have

16

1

there are some necessary third parties that need to be here

2

but we're asking the Court to deny their request.

3

you.

4
5

1

Thank

THE COURT:

All right.

Do you want to respond to

MR. BARON:

Your Honor, frankly, as I mentioned

that then?

6
7

in my reply a lot of what the defendant brings up is just

8

plain malarkey.

9

anything but even if you consider all that, it really has

Mr. Bowen never did interfere with

10

nothing to do with the essential facts of this case.

11

counsel was talking, I turned through my file, I see the

12

copy of the option and the lease signed in December.

13

if we completely ignore the one that I prepared in May, if

14

we throw out that one, it expired July lzZ of 1998.

15

is no allegation that he exercised the option.

16

allegation that he prepared any type of an extension on

17

that option.

18

July 1st of 1998.

19

that time and has been living in the property.

20

It expired.

As

Even

There

There is no

The accompanying lease expired

The defendant has paid no rent since

THE COURT:

What about her actions at the time of

21

the closing in terms of signing off?

22

with the contention that there was no interest in the

23

property?

24
25

MR. BARON:

Is that inconsistent

I think, your Honor, I think what had

happened is the defendant did continue to live there and
17

1

there was an attempt by the defendant to obtain both the

2

parties agreement to sell the property to a third person.

3

And once again he assigned any interest in the lease and

4

option prior to that time.

5 J documentation on this.

And I have seen no

They're alleging that Kristen

signed some things but even if she did, all that would mean
is that he was trying to get her to sell the property and
she at least signed some initial document to ready it for
9 I sale.

I don't know, that may have happened, but the sale

10

fell through.

11

point.

12
13

Clearly the option was long gone at that

THE COURT:

Why did the sale fall through?

Because Mr. Bowen's—

14

MR. BARON:

The sale fell through, your Honor,

15

because the property was worth some $30-40,000 more than

16

what the option purchase price was and that's what they

17

wanted to pay Kristen and Michael was the option amount.

18

The property had increased in value and was worth

19

substantially more and they had no desire to sell it to

20

anybody.

21

THE COURT:

So Kristen Hortin signed off on it

23

MR. BARON:

I don't know.

24

MR. MCKAY:

Yes.

25 J

MR. BARON:

We've heard allegations to that.

22

though.

18

1
2

THE COURT:

And Mr. Bowen needed to sign because

he was a lien holder of some kind.

3

MR. BARON:

Well, and that's another one of

4

those.

It's an unusual divorce decree.

Counsel's provided

5

a copy to the Court.

6

would be divorced.

7

interest in the property".

8

at the time of the divorce as is normal but was to be

9

determined later and there was several time periods at

But what it says is that the parties
That Mr. Bowen would "retain an
The equity was not determined

10

which that would be determined.

One of which would be the

11

sale of property or they would go out and have an appraisal

12

but he was still on the title all this time without any

13

kind of a lien.

14

and so clearly his signature would be required on any sale

15

of the property.

He was just a record owner of the property

And he didn't sign anything.

16

And once again, under the statute of frauds and

17

under that case that I submitted they both would have had

18

to sign to be able to consummate the sale.

19

Mr. Jones has no interest today as he stands before you in

20

this property.

21

we read the assignment that the Court has a copy of, let me

22

turn to it.

He assigned it.

And once again,

He says it's his wife.

If

It's a Dianna Marie Harrison.

23

MR. MCKAY:

That's his wife.

24

MR. BARON:

Why she has a different last name, I

25 J don't know.

But that's who he's assigned it to, she is not
19

1

living there.

Mr. Jones is living there.

I don't know who

2

or where she is but clearly she's not involved in this

3

matter.

4

received an assignment of what was left of the option to

We just want Mr. Jones out of the house.

She

5 J purchase which is frankly nothing but Mr. Jones has no
interest in that property at this point.
THE COURT:

Well, did he do any work on the

property to upgrade it?
9 I

MR. BARON:

He alleges that he did.

My client

10

has gone by and looked and he said he can't see that he's

11

done much of anything to the property.

12

under the case law if a tenant does some work on the

13

property or a person who's got an option and they don't

14

exercise that option or if they don't make their lease

15

payments, hey, they take the risk of losing whatever

16

they've put into the property.

17

this case.

18

gone by and has witnessed or looked for any improvements

19

and informs me, anyway, that he can't really see that was

20

alleged to be done was done.

21
22

But once again

And that's what happened in

If he has, in fact, like I say my client has

THE COURT:

So -

At least they're claiming they have

and that's -

23

MR. BARON

They're claiming they have -

24

THE COURT

- (over talking) -

25

MR. BARON

- but I think the answer to that is
20

1

that if he had it should have exercised his option and he

2

would have got the benefit of that or he should have made

3

his lease payments.

4

hasn't made his lease payments.

5

extent the option.

6

on is that some time months later one of the owners of the

7

property may have signed some documents indicating a

8

willingness to sell at that point but they both didn't

9

sign.

It's, yeah, it's undisputed.

It's undisputed he didn't

The only thing that he can try and rely

And that certainly doesn't revive the option.

10

That's a separate matter.

11

She's free to sell or not to sell at that point.

12

changed her mind and decided not to sell.

13

He

The option had already expired.
She

I would point out to the Court that under the

14

statutes in Utah and the case law on a motion for summary

15

judgment, you review the affidavits to see if there is

16

sufficient undisputed facts to award a judgment and I think

17

that under the affidavit it's clearly there are.

18

has mentioned a lot of matters that are not in the

19

affidavit some of which I've heard for the first time

20

today.

21

should be considering at this time.

22

Counsel

But certainly that's not something that the Court

THE COURT:

Okay.

I need to go back and look at

23

the scenario again and if you have something to submit on

24

the statute of frauds argument which were just raised, I'd

25

appreciate getting that.

But I'm going to have to take it
21

1

under advisement.

It's not as -

2

MR. MCKAY:

May I respond briefly?

3

THE COURT:

Well, ordinarily he gets the last

4

word but frankly if it's going to help me I just as soon

5

hear it all so MR. MCKAY:

6

She did sign off on the property and

7

all of that should be attached as an exhibit and if the

8

Court doesn't have the exhibit we will--and we argued all

9

these points in our memorandum.

We attached documents.

10

don't know if counsel hasn't received any or if he just

11

hasn't read it.

I

12

THE COURT:

Who was the title holder?

13

MR. MCKAY:

She was.

14

THE COURT:

Did he have, this Mr. Bowen, did he

15

have any other than his -

16
17

MR. MCKAY:
property to her.

18

MR. BARON:

19

MR. MCKAY:

20

The decree of divorce granted the

it.

His name was still on the deed.
Well, yeah, she was going to sell

Why should she go through the cost of taking him off?

21

THE COURT:

All right.

22

MR. MCKAY:

And refinancing, but -

23

THE COURT:

At any rate he was still on the

24
25

title, right?
MR. MCKAY:

Apparently so. But I think the main
22

1

reason why he had to sign off is to protect her so that he

2

couldn't claim that, you know, she sold the property for

3

less that it was worth or, you know, for some other reason.

4

It was to protect her so that he couldn't later come back

5

and try to get more.

6

Try to get more money out of the deal and I'm sure the

7

Court has seen that happen more than once.

8
9

THE COURT:

I mean this is a divorce after all.

But I guess, let me just, if he had

an interest though in the amount of the sale, if it

10

determines how much equity he is getting, I don't know that

11

I've got that in here or not.

12

enough to make it -

I don't know if I have

13

MR. MCKAY:

Could I help you with the decree?

14

THE COURT:

No, I just want to hear from -

15

MR. MCKAY:

We attached a copy of the decree.

16

guess the Court could read that.

17

clarify that.

18

It just grants him an interest in it.

19

seen title so I don't know if that's even the case and I

20

don't know that anybody has presented that.

21

I

Hopefully that will

I haven't seen any liens or anything else.
And I haven't even

We also think, feel that the Court should know

22

that, you know, and they've admitted to the increase in the

23

value, we say that that's largely due to what my client has

24

done to improve the value of the property.

25 J

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me just get at exactly
23

1

what the defense theory on how this option though was

2

revived in some way.

3

writing by her at the closing that would indicate that

4

there was at least an extension?

You're saying that there is some

5

MR. MCKAY:

Exactly.

6

MR. BARON:

Your Honor, I've looked in my file.

7
8
9

I can't find the document anywhere.
MR. MCKAY:

I've got a copy of it and I'm certain

that we attached that as an exhibit but if not, we can

10

provide that to everyone.

11

the transfer documents.

12

like a (inaudible) or something.

13
14
15

We have that she actually signed

We do have the documents, it was

• Did you keep that?
(Inaudible)
MR. MCKAY:

Apparently, it's in the evidence file

16

at my office.

17

provide that to, a copy to counsel and the Court.

18

I didn't bring the whole thing today.

THE COURT:

I can

Yeah, if there's some writing because

19

apparent, I mean, there is a problem apparently with the

20

statute of frauds if there isn't some kind of evidence of a

21

writing other than fraud.

22

fraud in the, in the -

And you're not saying there was

23

MR. BARON

I'm saying that the whole signing -

24

THE COURT

- December

25

MR. BARON

- document was fraud.

x

97 document?
But not in
24

1

December, no.

But December -

2

THE COURT:

But that's the one he's relying to -

3

MR. MCKAY:

No, they actually in their original

4

complaint never even mentioned that.

5

the second document.

6

first document in my response.

7

THE COURT:

8

relying on.

9
10

Right.

But that's the one that he's

On today, is that right.

You were

relying on the first one or the second one?
MR. MCKAY:

It doesn't matter to me.

Either or

both of them.

13
14

I was the one that brought up the

Because he's not saying there was any -

MR. BARON:

11
12

They only mentioned

THE COURT:
them.

He's not relying on either one of

He's saying there wasn't an option.

So, I'm -

15

MR. BARON:

I'm saying either option expired.

16

THE COURT:

I guess it's the defense's position

17

that there was, that there was some kind of an extension of

18

an option which gave him some kind of rights on this

19

property.

20

MR. MCKAY:

Exactly.

21

THE COURT:

And so if that' s the\ case, since he's

22

claiming that the one in November was some kind of a bogus

23

transaction, then he's relying on the one from December of

24

"91.

25

got to be an extension on one of them to have revived his

That expired, in fact, both of them expired.

There's

25

1

right.

2

claiming, on what basis he's claiming his right to the

3

option.

4

point.

5

extension and, if so, what supports that contention.

6

there is some document that supports it.

7

I guess I'm trying to find out what right he's

You know, there is no written option at that
The question is was there, was there some kind of

MR. MCKAY:

8

Court.

9

them.

If

Yeah, we'll present that to the

We do have those documents and we will present
I thought they were attached as an exhibit.

10

THE COURT:

Okay, well, -

11

MR. MCKAY:

But maybe they too (inaudible) to

12

provide that.

13
14

THE COURT:

- maybe you can present that with

your statute of frauds.

15

MR. MCKAY:

You know, and as far as the

16

assignment goes, and I don't know how counsel can claim

17

that he assigned something that counsel claims he didn't

18

own.

19

can he assign anything?

20

claim it both ways.

21

it but it didn't own it so he couldn't assign it.

22
23

I mean counsel claims he didn't own anything so how

THE COURT:

You know, I don't know how he can

Yeah, he owned it so he could assign

Okay.

I assume the assignment

documents are in here

24

MR. BARON:

They are.

25

THE COURT:

If he assigned something that he
26

1

didn't have any right to then it doesn't matter, it

2

doesn't, it doesn't mean that their contention is invalid

3

it just means that he didn't have right to make any

4

assignment.

5

MR. BARON:

No, I guess it just goes to -

6

THE COURT:

She wanted to sell it to the wife,

7

his wife, that's I guess between her and the wife, his

8

wife.

9

just trying to establish what his interest is in the

Whether he has a claim in it somehow.

I guess I'm

10

property and it needs to be established by some kind of

11

writing apparently and -

12

MR. MCKAY:

What, how, I guess I need to get a

13

feel from the Court whether they want us, whether your

14

Honor would like us to present some evidence regarding the

15

other issue about the unclean hands doctrine.

16

like we almost have to have an evidentiary hearing just on

17

that.

18

one of the parties, the spouse in this case, the husband,

19

meddles and makes it impossible for him to comply with the

20

terms of the agreement by chasing off his workers and

21

trying to do the work himself, you know, I don't know how,

22

that, that seems to me in and o f itself by his actions he

23

has made the, it impossible for my client to complete the

24

terms of the cont.ract timely.

25

to eight months t o complete and if he blocks the first

It seems

I mean if the parties enter into an agreement and

I mean, it was basically six

27

1

three months of that by his actions and running the guy

2

off, ;/ou know , my client needs to have that extra time

3

still to f inish.

4

you've got to finish by August or July, you know, and he

5

makes it impo ssible for the first three months.

Even if the terms of the contract say

THE COURT:

6

Maybe I don't, was this really

7

intended to b e an option to find a buye r for this property

8

or an opt.ion to actually pur-chase it because he's never,

9

apparently never intended to purchase the property.

10

MR. MCKAY:

No, he did have a buyer, he did

11

intend to purchase it but he had some personal

12

circumstances that required him to actually move.

13

know, he and his wife had a disagreement, they were

14

legally, I guess not legally, but they were separated

15

during all of the fiasco.

16

needed a place to live on a temporary basis.

17

part that this Court hasn't heard yet and I don't think

18

anyone is alleging, I'm not sure that it's, you know,

19

except that the Court felt that it was important to

20

address.

That also took place and so he

THE COURT:

22

his option to purchase it then?

24

So, that's

That's why we haven't -

21

23

You

MR. MCKAY:

Why didn't he, why didn't he exercise

Because he still felt like, I mean,

it was tied to two or three other deals and she had

28

1

continued to say, yeah, it's going to go, it's going to go,

2

it's going to go, and then he needed this additional time

3

to complete the financing.

4

probably should have gotten written, signed agreement.

5

MR. JONES:

And he thought, right, he

I have her understanding when we

6

preceded to closing that she signed,.

7

interim documents.

8

point, both the lease and options are dead in view points

9

anyway.

10
11
12
13

MR. MCKAY:

I didn't need any

I had the closing documents at this

I guess whatever it took to get to

the closing, they made it there.
THE COURT:

Well, let me see the closing.

documents and how that ties in.

14

MR. BARON:

Okay.

It's been hard for me to just

15

sit here and listen.

16

interference with the workmen occurred a year ago, either

17

in January or February of last year.

18

him behind from July 1st clear to November, no clue.

19

again we allege that didn't even happen but what he's

20

alleging is just a bunch of smoke screen.

21

bunch of things that mean nothing with regard to the

22

essential facts of the case.

23

what Kristen had signed.

24

purchase or a deed perhaps they would have some kind of a

But just once again, the alleged

How that could put
Once

It's just a

I'd be very interested to see

If she signed a contract to

29

1

point with regard to at least her agreeing to sell but once

2

again, when the original document was signed, Mr. Jones

3

felt like Mr. Bowen had an interest and he had him sign the

4

lease and the option on both of those lease and options.

5

So, apparently he believed he had an interest and yet he's

6

relying on one party to sell the property somehow.

7

what he's going to do is he's got someone lined up there.

8

He wants to sell it to my clients for one price and him

9

take the profit.

And

Now he's calling us bad guys simply

10

because we didn't let him exercise his expired option and

11

we want it to either sell it or (inaudible).

12

Your Honor, I'm very frustrated with this but I

13

have no problem with counsel providing copies of whatever

14

they have as far as the closing documents.

15

them prior to today but I think that based on the

16

affidavits and what's been submitted that we certainly are

17

entitled to summary judgment.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. MCKAY:

Would the Court consider my client

testifying?

22

THE COURT:

23

today.

24

hearing today so, -

25 I

Well, I'll take a look at

what's been presented.

20
21

Okay.

I have seen

No.

That wouldn't be appropriate

It's by affidavit and that, it's not an evidentiary

MR. MCKAY:

Thank you, your Honor.
30

1

THE COURT:

And it's based on the law, you know,

2

and you can submit it in an affidavit form.

3

to supplement though as to the statute of frauds argument.

4

MR. MCKAY:

Thank you, your Honor.

5 I

MR. BARON:

Thank you, your Honor.

I'll allow you

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)
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3
4

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

After spending some considerable time

5

on this case, I thought this might be the best way to

6

approach getting the decision out.

7

week and realized that probably in preparing the written

8

decision I was having to put a lot of background

9

information in.

That probably won't be necessary for me to

10

just give you my decision.

11

findings necessary.

12

I worked on it last

I understand that there will be

First of all, I'll state that I am going to grant

13

the motion for summary judgment.

And I'll explain why and

14

give you my findings in connection with that.

15

you to know that I had a law clerk, our law clerk working

16

on this at least two different occasions.

17

out to be a fairly complicated situation although--and let

18

me tell you the other problem I'm having with this is that

19

although this is the plaintiff's motion for summary

20

judgment, in assessing with the factual issues, it almost

21

essentially decides issues on the other side when there is

22

no counterclaim pending.

23

consequence of it.

24

order for me to get to the point to say that whether there

25

are or aren't issues of fact, I have to make that

I also want

This has turned

And I understand that that's the

I just don't see anyway around it.

In

1

1

determination.

2

At any rate, first of all, I want to address it

3

in this context.

4

expiration of the option.

5

of the parties is that it's the first option that was

6

entered into that's at issue, the first written option that

7

was signed by both the plaintiffs.

8

taking the position and taking all inferences in favor of

9

the defendant, the second option was signed at the closing

10

or the attempted closing on the sale of the property and it

11

was essentially considered a bogus kind of transaction.

12

So, I basically disregarded the second option as being of

13

any real value in this case.

14

presented to me and that's basically taking it with all

15

inferences in favor of the defense.

16

Looking at the issue regarding the
My understanding of the position

The second option,

That's essentially how it was

Clearly by it terms, the written option, the

17

first option, has expired.

It expired before the attempted

18

closing on the property.

19

expired.

20

was some kind of an extension given by Kristen Horton, an

21

oral extension.

22

factual issue to the extent that it is a material issue.

23

The problem with it is that the law is clear that Michael

24

Bowen, the joint owner of he property, is required under

There's no question that it was

The question, I guess, then becomes whether there

And I suppose that may be a disputed

25 I the statute of frauds to enter into any kind of a written
2

1

extension on the option, it having expired.

2

Going back over the divorce decree, it is clear

3

to me from the divorce decree that Michael Bowen continued

4

to have an interest in the property.

5

essentially states exactly that.

6

case, Kristen Horton, was awarded a possessory interest but

7

it also states in the divorce decree that the parties agree

8

that the defendant shall maintain an interest in the home.

9

The term interest goes far beyond just some kind

The divorce decree

The plaintiff in this

10

of a lien or some kind of ultimate wish to get some value

11

out of it.

12

piece of property has legal significance.

13

decree specifically maintains that he has an interest in

14

the home.

15

requires that if there is any transfer of the property or

16

extensions on options, those types of things, has to have

17

his approval.

18

any way that would approve the extension on the option.

19

had the clerk go through, make sure that there were no

20

allegations to that affect and my understanding is he did

21

not make any oral agreement to extend the option.

22

It, interest in a, a property interest in a
The divorce .

Having an interest in the home, therefore,

And it's undisputed that he did not act in
I

On the other hand, Kristen Plortin did clearly.

23

And that's, but that's neither here nor there.

24

bind him.

25

statute of frauds.

She cannot

There is no husband and wife exception to the
Part performance by one, even if I were
3

1

to assume that her behavior by appearing at the closing and

2

signing certain closing documents was partial performance

3

and therefore requires that any kind of oral extension be

4

enforced, the problem with that is that it still requires

5

Michael Bowen to participate in that and that's a matter of

6

law.

7

The other issue that was raised was whether by

8

some of his behavior, Michael Bowen should be estopped from

9

asserting some kind of a claim that his assent is required

10

for this transaction to go through.

11

be a fact sensitive issue also.

12

assume all facts favorable to the defense in this case that

13

Michael Bowen interfered and caused some problems with

14

exercising the option in a timely way, it also requires

15

that, on the other side that there be performance on the

16

option or the extension.

17

option was also tied to the lease which required rental

18

payments and it's undisputed in the case that the defendant

19

in this case did not make timely rental payments.

20

therefore, under theories of equity, a party cannot come

21

and ask for equity from the Court if they have not complied

22

with all terms of the agreement assuming it was enforceable

23

in equity.

24

That ordinarily would

However, even if you

And the problem with that is the

And,

And those are my reasons.
I want to just add also about the divorce decree,

25 I I recognize that there was some reliance on the section
4

1

that stated that the parties were to cooperate in signing

2

off on all titles and those types of things.

3

of the Divorce Decree states that each party or their heir

4

assigned shall immediately deliver all personal property

5

awarded to the other party in their possession and execute

6

and deliver all documents and titles necessary to affect a

7

property transfer as ordered in the decree of divorce to be

8

entered herein.

9

that that paragraph relates to the property transfer as

Paragraph 21

The problem with the reliance on that is

10

ordered by the decree of divorce.

11

did not order that the property be sold and it didn't

12

order, and it doesn't identify who it was that was supposed

13

to actually sell the property.

14

Kristen Hortin, had a possessory interest, both parties

15

maintained an interest in the home.

16

to the transfer of documents relates to whatever other

17

property was transferred back and forth.

18

they involves cars, those would be types of things like

19

that.

20

deliver all documents and titles necessary to affect a

21

property transfer as ordered in the Decree of Divorce.

22

don't see anything in the decree that orders that the home

23

be sold or that gives Kristen Hortin the sole

24

responsibility to sell it.

Titles to vehicles.

The decree of divorce

The plaintiff in that case,

The paragraph relating

I don't know if

It specifically says shall

I

I think it is significant in

25 I this case, also, that the defendant in this case is a
5

1

realtor and I guess I think that some of the case law makes

2

the point where there were attorneys involved in

3

transaction.

4

some expertise in real estate, a certain level of knowledge

5

can be imputed to them.

6

apparent that Mr. Bowen needed to participate and sign off

7

on these things.

8

transaction.

9

summary judgment.

10

I think with real estate, when someone has

It should have been fairly

The fact that he didn't is fatal to the

Therefore, I'm going to grant the motion for

And since we're here on it.

I don't know, I'm

11

going to ask plaintiff in this case to, plaintiff's counsel

12

to prepare the findings of fact and conclusions.

13

MR. BARON:

I will, your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

You can get a copy of this tape if it

15

will be helpful to you.

16

MR. BARON:

Very good.

17

THE COURT:

And in terms of answering any

18
19

questions about the other.
As far as other issues relating to the unlawful

20

detainer, the back rent that's due, those types of things.

21

I don't know where we stand and I haven't sat down to try

22

to figure out what it might be.

23

time has past.

I realize some substantial

Is Mr. Jones still in the property?

24

MR. MCKAY:

Yes.

25 J

MR. BARON:

He is, he's still there.
6

1

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, -

2

MR. BARON:

I'll just compute that, your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

All right.

Do you want to just

4

compute it and run it past Mr. McKay and then see if you

5

can't agree on what that is.

6

MR. BARON:

Very good.

7

THE COURT:

And submit the documents approved as

8

to form so I can go ahead and just get them signed.

9

MR. BARON:

Thank you, your Honor.

10

MR. MCKAY:

Just to make sure I understand.

11

Could you address the unlawful detainer portion?

12

THE COURT:

Well, because he's basically, the

13

conclusion is the option is expired.

He does not have an

14

interest in this property.

15

aside, frankly.

16

whether he has any claim against Kristen Hortin for any of

17

the reliance that he had on things that she may have done

18

and said to him.

19

not, he can't force the sale and make Mr. Bowen go through

20

with it.

21

have done, if, in fact, that's found to have happened, if

22

she, in fact, did not act in a fair and honest way dealing

23

with Mr. Jones, he may have a claim against her, you know.

24

This doesn't preclude anything like that.

25

that this wasn't a part of this action.

Now, I will say this as an

This does not address this issue about

I'm just saying as a matter of law, he's

Unfortunately, anything that Kristen Hortin may

But it's just
I'm just saying as
7

1

a matter of law when you have to look at joint owners of

2

property, there is certain legal requirements before the

3

Court can recognize that there has been a transfer and

4

that's with the Statute of Frauds.

5

MR. BARON:

One question I would have for counsel

6

is, is Mr. Jones going to move out on his own or we need

7

the sheriff involved?

8

MR. MCKAY:

We haven't talked about that.

9

THE COURT:

Maybe you can talk about it now

10

before you all leave and work that out together.

I don't

11

know that you, obviously you're entitled to it.

And when I

12

get the documents, I'll sign them.

13

MR. BARON:

Are we clear on that they're, not

14

only is this Court ruling that the option expired but that

15

he is also in unlawful detainer?

16

THE COURT:

I'm granting the motion for summary

17

judgment but I had to, frankly, normally I wouldn't have

18

dealt with all the issues about the option except that were

19

raised in defense.

20

didn't, you know, if there weren't factual issues relating

21

to those defenses.

22

motion for summary judgment on the unlawful detainer

23

finding that he is currently in a position of being a

24

renter rather than having an interest in the property.

25

therefore I'll grant the unlawful detainer that he's

Therefore, I felt like I had to.

If I

The primary issues, I'm granting the

And

1

holding over without having paid the rent.

2

undisputed.

That's

3

MR. MCKAY:

What about attorney's fees?

4

THE COURT:

Pardon me?

5

MR. MCKAY:

Attorney's fees?

6

MR. BARON:

We had a s k e d f o r a t t o r n e y ' s

7

fees,

y o u r Honor.

8

THE COURT:

And w h a t ,

9

MR. MCKAY:

So d i d we.

10

THE COURT:

What - pardon me?

11

MR. MCKAY:

I'm just saying both sides asked for

12
13

I believe

attorneys' fees.
THE COURT:

Yeah, I guess what I'm asking, what

14

is the basis for attorneys' fees?

15

think the agreement expired.

16

-

MR. BARON:

If it's the agreement, I

That's true, I would just as soon

17

you'd cite pay your own attorney's fees.

18

any out of pocket costs that we've expended.

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

We would ask for

As the prevailing party you

20

are entitled to costs and if you're willing to just back

21

off from the attorney's fees issues then.

22

MR. BARON:

Well , I think you' re right.

23

the option ha;3 expired and that would have had the

24

attc)rney' s fees in it.

25

THE COURT:

The option lease, ri(jht.

I think

Now, I may
9

1

not have stated all the findings as articulately as I

2

should have so I would appreciate it if you would make

3

sure, you know, that everything is included that should be

4

in terms of purposes of perfecting an appeal on all of

5

that.

6

Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Baron,

7

MR. MCKAY:

Thank you, your Honor.

8

MR. BARON:

Thank you.

9 I

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)

10
11
12
13

5
6
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8
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